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“NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE A BULLY: WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
PRINCIPLE OF CONTENT NEUTRALITY SHOULD APPLY WITH LESS FORCE IN THE
CONTEXT OF REGULATING BULLYING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS”
BY PAOLA A. GUIDO
“The problem of bullying has been shrouded in myth and misunderstanding for
far too many years. As educators . . . we simply have not taken the problem of bullying
seriously enough . . . [it]is very much an education priority that goes to the heart of
school performance and school culture.”
United States Secretary of Education Arne Duncan.1
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2012, almost fifty million students attended U.S. public elementary and
secondary schools.2 Studies indicate that twenty to thirty percent of students in grades six
through twelve are victims of bullying at school.3 Since February 2012, approximately fortyeight states have enacted legislation against student speech that constitutes bullying.4 The recent
surge of interest in anti-bullying legislation and research has been attributed to the public outcry
against bullying-related student suicides.5 In August 2010, the U.S. Departments of Education,

Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Education, The Myths About Bullying: Remarks at the Bullying Prevention Summit
(Aug. 11, 2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/myths-about-bullying-secretary-arne-duncansremarks-bullying-prevention-summit.
2
Participation in Education: Elementary/Secondary Enrollment, INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION SCIENCES – NATIONAL
CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS (last visited Mar. 5, 2013), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/tables/table-enl1.asp.
3
Bullying: Overview, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development,
http://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/bullying/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Nov. 30, 2012).
4
The only states without an anti-bullying law are Montana and South Dakota. John T. Ceglia, The Disappearing
Schoolhouse Gate: Applying Tinker in the Internet Age, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 939, 872 (2012) (internal citation omitted).
5
Ramin Setoodeh, Phoebe Prince’s Legacy: A Town Tries to Heal, PEOPLE, Oct. 18, 2010, available at
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20432959,00.html; Brett Smiley, Harlem Boy Commits Suicide
After Relentless Bullying, N.Y. MAG., May 23, 2012, available at http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2012/05/harlem-boycommits-suicide-after-harsh-bullying.html; Rachel Ehmke, 13-Year-Old Minnesota Student, Commits Suicide After
Months Of Bullying, HUFFINGTON POST, May 8, 2012, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/08/rachel-ehmke-13-year-old-_n_1501143.html; Jamey Rodemeye, 14Year Old Boy, Commits Suicide After Gay Bullying, Parents Carry On Message, HUFFINGTON POST, May 20, 2011,
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/20/jamey-rodemeyer-suicide-gay-bullying_n_972023.html;
See Samantha Neiman, Brandon Robers, Simone Robers, Bullying: A State of Affairs, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 603, 609
(citing Swearer et al., What can be done about school bullying? Linking Research to Educational Practice, 39
EDUC. RESEARCHER 38, 38 (2010)).
1
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Health and Human Services, Agriculture, the Interior, and Justice sponsored the Federal National
Bullying Summit in Washington, D.C.6 Secretary of Education Arne Duncan announced the
purpose of this federal summit, the first on the issue, as a “launch [of the] sustained commitment
to address and reduce bullying.”7 However, no federal law currently exists that addresses
bullying directly.8 Instead, bullying may constitute discriminatory harassment, which is
addressed by several federal civil rights laws.9 When bullying is based on race, national origin,
color, sex, age, disability, or religion, it may violate one of these laws. A school that receives
federal funding has an obligation to address and remedy the harassment.10
On January 5, 2011, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed the Anti-Bullying Bill of
Rights Act into law. 11 New Jersey is one of the many states that have enacted or recently
strengthened their anti-bullying statutes. Labeled the country’s “toughest law against bullying
and harassment in schools,”12 it was enacted just months after the tragic suicide of Tyler
Clementi, a Rutgers University undergraduate student who was bullied by his peers for his

6

Federal Partners in Bullying Prevention Summit, JUVENILE JUSTICE VERMONT,
http://www.juvenilejusticevt.org/juvenile-justice/federal-partners-in-bullying-prevention-summit/.
7
Duncan, supra note 1.
8
Anti-bullying legislation has been proposed at the national level on numerous occasions during the last decade. In
2004, federal anti-bullying legislation was proposed in the House of Representatives as an amendment to the Safe
and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act. H.R. 4776(g)(12)(B), (13)(B), 108th Cong. (2004). In 2009, a bill
was introduced in the House of Representatives titled, “Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act.” H.R. 1966,
111th Cong. § 3(a) (1st Session 2009). An amendment to the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act was
re-introduced in 2009. H.R. 2262, 111th Cong. (2009). In 2011, the Safe Schools Improvement Act of 2011 was
introduced in the Senate. H.R. 1648, 112th Cong. (2011).
9
Some examples include: Title IV and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–7 (2012); Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012); Titles II and III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012); Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012).
10
Federal Laws, STOPBULLYING.GOV, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
http://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/federal (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
11
Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, ch. 122, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13.2 (West 2010).
12
Richard Perez Pena, Christie Signs Tougher Law on Bullying in Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2011), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/nyregion/07bully.html?_r=0; See also Emmeline Zhao, New Jersey’s AntiBullying Law, Toughest in Country Garners Praise and Criticism, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/02/new-jerseys-anti-bullying_n_946625.html (“The law . . . is said to be
the toughest piece of anti-bullying legislation in the country.”) (last updated Nov. 2, 2011, 6:12 AM).
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sexuality.13 According to the New Jersey Department of Education, the intent of the anti-bullying
legislation is to “strengthen standards and procedures for preventing, reporting, investigating and
responding to HIB [harassment, intimidation and bullying] incidents of students in school and off
school premises.”14 The law requires school districts to follow specialized protocols in reporting
and investigating all bullying complaints.15
States, local governments, and school districts, in attempting to resolve the ongoing
bullying crisis within our public school systems, are enacting anti-bullying laws and policies that
may infringe on students’ First Amendment rights. In the implementation of these laws, school
administrators must balance the need to protect their students’ emotional and physical well-being
with their constitutional First Amendment rights. Critics have attacked the New Jersey antibullying statute on various First Amendment grounds. One commentator perceives the statute as
potentially overbroad in its definition of prohibited conduct.16 He also estimates the law could
infringe upon religious and political freedoms of students.17
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, the Supreme Court held that a public school
cannot punish a student’s speech unless it “‘materially and substantially interfer[es] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding with
the rights of others.”18 Many of the present anti-bullying laws codify or somehow incorporate the

13

Tyler committed suicide on September 22, 2010. He was an 18-year old freshman at Rutgers who grew up in
Ridgewood, New Jersey. Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
29, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30suicide.html?ref=tylerclementi.
14
Guidance for Schools on Implementing the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (P.L. 2010, c.122), N.J. DEP’T OF
EDUC., 6 (Dec. 2011), http://www.nj.gov/education/students/safety/behavior/hib/guidance.pdf.
15
See Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, ch. 122, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15.
16
Derek Bambauer, Cyberbullying and the Cheese-Eating Surrender Monkeys, CONCURRING OPINIONS, (Feb. 21,
2012, 10:20 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/02/cyberbullying-and-the-cheese-eatingsurrender-monkeys.html. Professor Bambauer was a panelist at the Seton Hall Legislative Journal’s 2012
Symposium titled, “Bullying and the Social Media Generation: the Effects of the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Statute
on School Administration, Students, and Teachers.”
17
Id.
18
393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
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Tinker standard for regulating student speech in public schools.19 Some of these laws, including
New Jersey’s, also permit school officials to punish off-campus bullying.20 New Jersey’s
recently amended anti-bullying law incorporates the Tinker standard by requiring that the bully’s
speech “substantially disrupt[] or interfere[] with the orderly operation of the school or the rights
of other students.”21
One of the most important critiques of the New Jersey anti-bullying law is that it is a
content-based restriction.22 This federal First Amendment principle of content neutrality requires
that the government be a neutral arbiter in regulating all speech, even when it is unprotected. The
Supreme Court has clarified that the government cannot pick and choose what it will punish even
though it is punishing unprotected speech. Instead of prohibiting all bullying that is proscribable
and unprotected under Tinker, the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights enumerates certain

19

See Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, ch. 122, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 618-514(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2007) (prohibiting bullying “[b]y an electronic act that results in the substantial disruption
of the orderly operation of the school or educational environment”); Safe School Climate Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 5963-120(1)(b) (Supp. 2008) (prohibiting bullying when it causes “substantial disruption in, or substantial interference
with, the orderly operation of the school”).
20
§ 18A:37-14 (requiring school officials to report bullying that “takes place on school property, at any schoolsponsored function, on a school bus, or off school grounds.”).
21
Id.
22
See Part I for a discussion of the content neutrality principle and its application in the realm of student speech in
public schools.
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characteristics that may motivate a student to harass, intimidate or bully another student.23 Some
states have enacted similar anti-bullying laws with enumerated characteristics.24
This Note will focus on the issue of the New Jersey law’s potential violation of the
principle of content neutrality. It will discuss whether the regulation of student speech in public
schools is subject to the principle of content neutrality. This Note argues that the principle of
content neutrality, in the realm of independent student speech that causes a substantial disruption
under Tinker, should be relaxed when dealing with the regulation of bullying. Specially, this
Note will focus on New Jersey’s revised anti-bullying law. Content discrimination should be
permitted in this context because bullying is a serious impediment to the state’s ability to carry
out its educational mission. Further, the school setting involves a “captive” audience similar to
that of the workplace setting, where the Supreme Court has held that since the public workplace
environment involves a “captive” audience,25 the important public policies that govern such an
environment “may justify some limitations on the free speech rights of employers and
Id. (The statute punishes “any gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any electronic communication,
whether it be a single incident or a series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as being motivated either by any
actual or perceived characteristic, such as race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
gender identity and expression, or a mental, physical or sensory disability, or by another other distinguishing
characteristic that takes place on school property, at any school-sponsored function, on a school bus, or off school
grounds as provided for in section 16 of P.L.2010, c.122 (C.18A:37-15.3), that substantially disrupts or interferes
with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other students and that . . . a reasonable person should know,
under the circumstances, will have the effect of physically or emotionally harming a student or damaging the
student's property, or placing a student in reasonable fear of physical or emotional harm to his person or damage to
his property; [] has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student or group of students; or [] creates a hostile
educational environment for the student by interfering with a student’s education or by severely or pervasively
causing physical or emotional harm to the student.”).
24
See e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-23.79(a) (West Supp 2011) (punishing bullying based on “race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, physical or mental disability, military status, sexual
orientation, gender-related identity or expression, unfavorable discharge from military service”); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
12(1) (prohibiting “acts based on a person's actual or perceived race, color, weight, national origin, ethnic group,
religion, religious practice, disability, sexual orientation, gender or sex.”).
25
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (holding that the public employee’s speech did not raise an issue of
public concern, and explaining that “the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable
for employee complaints over internal office affairs.”); CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (holding the
Hatch Act prohibition against federal employees taking an active part in political management or in political
campaigns did not violate the employees’ First Amendment rights as it was in the best interests of the country to
limit the political influence of federal employees on others as well as on the electoral process); NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (explaining that a private employee’s speech that occurred in the workplace could
be restricted in a manner that would otherwise be impermissible if it were outside of the workplace setting).
23
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employees.”26 The traditional justifications for the principle of content neutrality, including the
marketplace of ideas theory, also have less force in the context of student speech in public
schools. Our society’s commitment to freedom of speech must be balanced with the state’s need
to educate our students, a captive audience whose speech interests in the context of bullying
legislation must give way to other countervailing concerns.
Part I of this Note sets out the background of the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights
and presents potential legal challenges to the law. It also discusses the principle of content
neutrality and applies it to the New Jersey anti-bullying statute. Part II sets out relevant case law
handed down after the Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker and explains the application of the
content neutrality principle in the public school context. Finally, Part III sets out this Note’s core
argument and concludes that content-based regulations should be permitted in a state’s regulation
of bullying in public schools.
PART I: THE NEW JERSEY ANTI-BULLYING BILL OF RIGHTS ACT AND THE POTENTIAL CHALLENGE
ON THE BASIS OF CONTENT DISCRIMINATION
A. The New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act
On November 22, 2010, the New Jersey Legislature passed the Anti-Bullying Bill of
Rights Act with overwhelming support in both houses.27 The legislation became effective on
September 1, 2011.28 The law was enacted after a number of studies were conducted on the
effects and prevalence of bullying. The legislative findings specifically reference but do not cite
a 2009 study by the United States Department of Justice and Education which reported that
thirty-two percent of students ages twelve through eighteen were bullied during the prior school
year. Further, the study found that twenty-five percent of the public schools that responded to the
26

Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 121, 159 (Cal. 1999).
Anti-Bullying, NEW JERSEY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (last visited January 12, 2013), http://www.njea.org/issuesand-political-action/anti-bullying.
28
Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, ch. 122, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13.1 (West 2010).
27
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survey indicated that bullying was an issue on a daily or weekly basis within their schools.29
Media coverage of bullying-related suicides was also a catalyst for the anti-bullying statute. The
legislative findings acknowledge that the “chronic persistence of school bullying ha[d] led to
student suicides across the country, including in New Jersey.”30
The declared intent by the New Jersey Legislature in enacting the anti-bullying law was
to “strengthen the standards and procedures for preventing, reporting, investigating, and
responding to incidents of harassment, intimidation, and bullying of students that occur in school
and off school premises.”31 The statute did indeed strengthen New Jersey’s existing anti-bullying
law by implementing extensive training programs for school staff along with speedy response
methods for bullying incidents, among other changes.
The law’s co-sponsor, state senate majority leader Barbara Buono, called it “a powerful
message to every child in New Jersey.”32 However, the initial response to the new anti-bullying
law was mixed. Many perceived it as legally problematic for the state and public school
administrators due to potential constitutional infirmities. One school psychologist perceived it as
“empowering children to use the term ‘bullying’ and to speak up for themselves and for
others.”33 Some advocate that the New Jersey law should become a model anti-bullying law for
other states.34 Critics of the law, however, believe that it is too onerous for teachers and too

29

Id.
Id.
31
Id.
32
Adam Cohen, Why New Jersey’s Antibullying Law Should be a Model for Other States, TIME MAG. (Sept. 6,
2011), available at http://ideas.time.com/2011/09/06/why-new-jerseys-antibullying-law-should-be-a-model-forother-states/.
33
Perez Pena, supra note 12.
34
Cohen, supra note 32.
30
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burdensome on the financially restrained budgets of New Jersey school districts.35 Initially, the
anti-bullying statute did not provide any funds for its implementation.36 After the law was
challenged as an unfunded mandate, Governor Christie signed amendments that appropriated $1
million in grants to maintain the law’s constitutionality.37
B. The Principle of Content Neutrality
Among the strongest potential constitutional challenges to the New Jersey anti-bullying
law is a violation of the First Amendment principle of content neutrality. The Supreme Court has
made clear the government cannot regulate speech based on its content.38 The content neutrality
principle has been labeled the “most pervasively employed doctrine in the jurisprudence of free
expression.”39 Under this doctrine, a law is content-based if its application is contingent on the
speech’s message–whether it is the subject matter of the message or the viewpoint the message
expresses. When a regulation is impermissibly content-based, courts will apply the strict scrutiny
standard of review.40 To achieve content neutrality, the government must regulate speech in both
a subject-matter and a viewpoint neutral manner.41

See John F. McKeon, Commentary: Thanks to Gov. Christie, New Jersey’s Suburban School Districts are Getting
$492 Million Less, NEWSROOM N.J. (July 14, 2011, 11:36 AM),
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/commentary/thanks-to-gov-christie-new-jerseys-suburban-school-districtsare-getting-492-million-less; Charles Hack, Hudson County School Districts Complain Christie’s Funding for AntiBullying Initiative Doesn’t Go Very Far, NJ.COM (July 12, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.nj.com/jjournalweeklies/index.ssf/2012/07/hudson_county_school_districts.html (indicating that the Hoboken school district only
received $154 for the implementation of its anti-bullying efforts).
36
New Jersey Not Fully Funding Schools for Reimbursements to Implement Anti-Bullying Legislation, NAT’L SCH.
BD. ASS’N (July 12, 2012), http://legalclips.nsba.org/?p=15307.
37
Surveys conducted regarding the financial and staffing impacts of the law on school districts revealed that more
than $2 million was actually spent by school districts in 2011-2012 to implement it. There remains to be seen
whether the law will once again be challenged as an unfunded state mandate. Governor Signs Anti-Bullying
Amendments, N.J. SCH. BDS. ASS’N (last visited Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.njsba.org/sb_notes/20120327/hib.html.
38
Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).
39
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 189 (1983).
40
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). See also Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980) (“Where a government restricts the speech of a private
person, the state action may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn
means of serving a compelling state interest.”).
41
Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality As A Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme
Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 51 (2000).
35
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Subject-matter discrimination occurs when the government targets speech because of the
subject or topic it addresses.42 Viewpoint discrimination is “discrimination because of the
speaker's specific motivating ideology, opinion, or perspective.”43 At times, these two categories
overlap, and the Court itself has admitted that the distinction between the two is not precise.44
The Supreme Court’s concern with content-based discrimination is that the government,
through its regulation of speech, will “suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the
public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”45 The principle of content neutrality
requires that the government be a neutral arbiter in regulating speech. Federal, state and local
governments therefore cannot take sides in the public debate.
In the Supreme Court decision of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court made clear that the
principle of content neutrality applies even when the government is regulating unprotected
speech.46 The city of St. Paul, Minnesota, enacted a law which made it a misdemeanor to place
on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization, or graffiti–including
a burning cross, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know “arouses anger, alarm or
resent in other on the basis of race, color, creed religion or gender.”47 The defendant moved to
dismiss the charge against him on the basis that the ordinance was content-based and thus invalid
on its face.48

42

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 819-20 (1995).
Id. at 820.
44
See id. at 830.
45
Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 641.
46
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992) (“These areas of speech can, consistently with the First
Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not
that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for
content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.”) (emphasis in original).
47
Id. at 380. The ordinance stated, “Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id.
48
Id. The defendant and several teenagers were charged under the ordinance for burning a cross inside the yard of a
Black family. Id. at 379.
43
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The Supreme Court found the St. Paul ordinance facially unconstitutional for a number of
reasons. 49 Namely, the ordinance did not apply to all fighting words – a category of unprotected
speech; it only applied to those that insult or provoke violence on the basis of certain
characteristics such as race, color, creed, religion or gender.50 The regulation of this speech was
based on its topic and was therefore subject-matter based. Other displays were permissible under
the ordinance if they did not fall within these specified categories.51 To illustrate the application
of the content neutrality principle to unprotected speech, the Court explained that even though
the government is permitted to restrict all libel, it could not proscribe only libel critical of the
government.52 The ordinance was also impermissibly viewpoint based, as it only punished
fighting words that involved these certain categories. 53
C. The Challenge to New Jersey’s Law Under R.A.V.’s Content Neutrality Principle
As stated by the majority in R.A.V., content discrimination of speech is present when the
regulation or policy discriminates against speech on the basis of the speaker’s message.54
Whether a regulation is content neutral depends on whether the speech regulation is imposed to
restrict the topic or viewpoint being discussed. When a regulation is content-based, the courts
will apply strict scrutiny.55
In R.A.V. v. St. Paul, the city chose to prosecute the defendants under the Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance. In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia explained that the city had “sufficient
means at its disposal to prevent [the defendant’s] behavior without adding the First Amendment

49

Id. at 381.
Id. at 378.
51
Id. at 391. The Court gave the examples of other categories such as “political affiliation, union membership, or
homosexuality” that could be used as fighting words but were not covered by the ordinance at issue.
52
R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 384.
53
Chemerinsky, supra note 42 (explaining that viewpoint neutrality does not permit the government to regulate
speech due to its ideology).
54
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 819-20 (1995).
55
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
50
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to the fire.”56 The New Jersey anti-bullying statute may also be challenged for opening the door
to First Amendment challenges on the basis of content-discrimination.
The definition of harassment, intimidation, and bullying in the New Jersey Anti-Bullying
Bill of Rights Act is very broad: the categories it enumerates characterize it as content-based on
its face. The law restricts:
“any gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any electronic communication,
whether it be a single incident or a series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as
being motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic, such as race, color,
religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and
expression, or a mental, physical or sensory disability, or by another distinguishing
characteristic, that takes place on school property, at any school-sponsored function, on a
school bus, or off school grounds . . . that substantially disrupts or interferes with the
orderly operation of the school or the rights of other students.”57
With the inclusion of the phrase, “substantially disrupts or interferes with the orderly operation
of the school or the rights of other students,” the law is punishing unprotected speech that falls
under the Tinker framework. Thus, the law is punishing speech that is unprotected under the First
Amendment.
However, as demonstrated below, the New Jersey anti-bullying law, rather than
restricting all speech that is proscribed under Tinker, or all speech that “substantially disrupts or
interferes with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other students,” selectively
punishes certain unprotected student speech based upon the listener’s reaction to the speech and
upon certain characteristics of the victim. 58
a. Subject Matter Discrimination

56

Id.
Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, ch. 122, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2010).
58
Id.
57
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In R.A.V., individuals who used fighting words in the context of ideas outside of the
ordinance’s enumerated categories would not be punished.59 The majority provided examples of
other characteristics such as, “political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality” that
could be used as fighting words but that were not covered by the local law. 60 To some extent,
the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights is similar to the St. Paul ordinance in R.A.V., as it
punishes bullying that may cause a substantial disruption only on the basis of certain motivating
characteristics.61 By enumerating particular categories, namely “race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, or a mental, physical
or sensory disability,” the New Jersey legislature may be challenged for committing the same
error as the city of St. Paul.62 The New Jersey anti-bullying law is therefore seemingly punishing
student speech on the basis of the subject matter or topic in its message.
After listing specific characteristics, the New Jersey legislature also added the phrase “or
by another distinguishing characteristic.”63 This additional wording suggests that the legislature
attempted to remain content-neutral and therefore within the bounds of R.A.V. While this catch
all provision may be intended to alleviate any concerns related to content discrimination, it may
not save the statute from constitutional challenge. A potential challenger to this anti-bullying
statute could argue that the state is targeting certain categories of substantial disruption or
interference and leaving out others even with the use of this catch-all phrase.
A challenger could argue that the law nonetheless discriminates on the basis of subject
matter. For instance, the phrase “distinguishing characteristic” may not reach bullying that is

59

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 378 (“[D]isplays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are
permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics.”).
60
Id. at 391.
61
Id.
62
§ 18A:37-14.
63
Id.
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motivated by certain viewpoints held by a victimized student. Consider a student who is
subjected to bullying by her peers due to her pro-choice beliefs. Is the student’s pro-choice
viewpoint is a “distinguishing characteristic?” If school officials perceive it as such, the bully
can be punished. If not, a student who bullies a peer who holds pro-choice viewpoints will not be
punished, whereas a student who victimizes another student for his or her pro-life beliefs can be
punished, as long as the victim’s pro-life stance stems from his or her religious beliefs–a
characteristic enumerated in the statute. Therefore, the phrase “any other distinguishing
characteristic” does not alleviate the concerns of content discrimination associated with the
statute.
a. Communicative Impact
The New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights may also be challenged as content-based
because it regulates student speech based on its effect on the listener. In other words, it restricts
speech on the basis of its communicative impact. In the Third Circuit case of Saxe v. State
College Area School District, the plaintiffs challenged a school district’s anti-harassment policy
on First Amendment grounds. The school argued that the anti-harassment law’s application to
the students’ expressive conduct was justified as a regulation of the speech’s secondary effects
and therefore an exception to the content neutrality principle of R.A.V. The Third Circuit rejected
this argument on the grounds that the Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he emotive impact of
speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary effect.’”64
The New Jersey statute requires that the speech substantially disrupt or interfere with the
operation of the school or the rights of other students.65 It also requires that the restricted speech
be that which “a reasonable person should know, under the circumstances, will have the effect of
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physically or emotionally harming a student or . . . placing a student in reasonable fear of . . .
emotional harm to his person.”66 It also requires that the speech have the “effect of insulting or
demeaning any student or group of students.”67 This terminology indicates that the statute aims
to regulate a bully’s speech because of its emotive impact on the victim. Since the law punishes
speech based on its communicative impact on the listener, it raises constitutional concerns on the
basis of content neutrality.
PART II: THE APPLICATION OF THE CONTENT NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF
REGULATING STUDENT SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Where a student’s independent speech “materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others,” courts are divided on whether the
regulation on such speech must be content neutral. The confusion on this issue arose from
contradicting and confusing Supreme Court precedent beginning with the landmark case of
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.68
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker made clear that “[f]irst Amendment rights,
applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers
and students.”69 In Tinker, officials of a public school adopted a policy prohibiting students from
wearing armbands to school.70 The officials enacted this policy after they were informed that a
group of high school students was planning on wearing black armbands to school in protest of
the Vietnam War. When the students decided to wear the armbands, they were suspended.71 The
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students argued that their First Amendment rights had been violated and sought an injunction
restraining the school from disciplining them.72
The Supreme Court agreed with the students and adopted a balancing approach
previously employed by the Fifth Circuit.73 The Court declared that a school cannot punish the a
student’s speech unless it “‘materially and substantially interfer[es] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights of
others.”74 The majority reasoned that a substantial disruption or a material interference could not
have been reasonably “forecast” by the school officials.75 Indeed, no actual disruption of
interference occurred as the discussion of the armbands did not interfere with work inside the
classroom.76
Following Tinker, most courts have focused on the first prong of the substantial
disruption test. Whether a student’s speech “collides with the rights of others” has not earned
much attention.77 Although the Tinker standard was framed in the disjunctive, the second prong
alone has seldom been relied upon. Some courts have refused to apply the second prong due to
the Supreme Court’s failure to define or clarify what it meant by the phrase “rights of others.”78
In later cases, the Court narrowed the extent of Tinker’s reach.
The Supreme Court in Tinker also addressed the issue of content neutrality in the context
of regulating student speech. The school policy prohibiting only black armbands was especially
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problematic to the Court because it was content-based. Instead of banning all armbands that were
political or controversial, the school banned only those that conveyed a certain message.79 The
Court pointed out that some of the students wore buttons with Nazi symbols, but those
viewpoints were not prohibited.80 In effect, the students’ expression–opposition to the war in
Vietnam–was “singled out” by the school officials for punishment. The Court stated that such
viewpoint discrimination, “without evidence that it is necessary to avoid a substantial
interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.”81 Some
commentators argue that this statement by the Court seemingly acknowledged that the
prohibition of a particular opinion could be justified as long as it amounted to a material
disruption under Tinker’s framework.82 In other words, content discrimination could be
permissible under such circumstances.
B. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
Over fifteen years after the Tinker decision, the Supreme Court again confronted an issue
of student speech in public schools. In Fraser, a student was suspended for delivering a speech at
a high school assembly.83 Although the district court and the court of appeals both struck down
79
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the suspension on the basis that there was no substantial disruption or material interference under
Tinker, the Supreme Court placed great emphasis on granting the state and its educators more
leeway to curtail “vulgar,” “lewd, indecent or offensive speech” in schools.84 Unlike the lower
courts, the Supreme Court did not apply the “substantial disruption” test from Tinker. The Court
found the student’s language to be “offensively lewd and indecent speech,” and upheld his
suspension. 85 In effect, speech in public schools that is “vulgar,” “lewd, indecent or offensive” is
seemingly carved out as an exception to the Tinker analysis.86
Most importantly, the Court in Fraser closely examined what the majority in Tinker
merely touched upon–the mission of public education and the tension that arises when trying to
balance students’ free speech rights with the interests of the state and local government in its role
as an educator.87 When the Court wrote that a student’s constitutional rights are “not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,” it clarified that the legal
analytical framework established in Tinker is not absolute. 88 As the Court later explained in
Morse v. Frederick, “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school
context, it would have been protected.”89 However, since “the State has interests in teaching high
school students how to conduct civil and effective public discourse and in avoiding disruption of
educational school activities,” the Supreme Court permitted more restrictive speech regulations
within the school setting.90
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The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the analysis it utilized in Fraser “is not
entirely clear.”91 Lower courts have interpreted Fraser as standing for the proposition that there
is no First Amendment protection for “lewd,” “vulgar,” “indecent or offensive speech” in
schools.92 When dealing with the regulation of this particular type of student speech, courts apply
a reasonableness standard that grants more deference to schools.
In terms of the content neutrality principle, the Court indicated that no content
discrimination was present because the school did not suspend the student to curtail the
viewpoint he expressed.93 Rather, the school punished the offensive mode of expression or the
manner in which Fraser delivered the speech.94 The Court pointed out that this case was different
from Tinker, which involved core speech and the suppression of a political viewpoint.95
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
The Supreme Court moved further away from Tinker in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.96 In that case, the school district censored two student-authored articles on teenage
pregnancy and divorce for the school newspaper. 97 They were censored on grounds that they
involved inappropriate subjects.98 The students’ challenge of the suspension on First Amendment
grounds did not succeed. The Court drew a distinction between independent student speech,
which is subject to the Tinker test, and school-sponsored speech. Instead of applying Tinker’s
substantial disruption test, the Court applied a reasonableness standard to school-sponsored
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speech that could be perceived as bearing the “imprimatur of the school.”99 School-sponsored
activities are those that “may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or
not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty
members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and
audiences.”100
The Court announced that schools can exercise control over the “style and content of
student speech in school-sponsored activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”101 In applying this reasonableness standard, the majority held
the censorship was not an infringement on the students’ First Amendment rights. Due to the
schools’ valid pedagogical interest to regulate the content of these publications, the Court
concluded that the school’s interest in regulating the curriculum outweighed the students’ interest
in expressing themselves102
The majority opinion did not address content neutrality, even though it was discussed in
the parties’ briefs and during oral argument before the Court.103 However, Justice Brennan’s
dissent did address the issue. He accused the school officials’ and the Court of “camouflage[ing]
viewpoint discrimination as the ‘mere’ protection of students from sensitive topics.”104 At least
two commentators have suggested that some of the Justices were simply not satisfied with the
content neutrality requirement’s implications for school-sponsored speech and therefore the
Court did not address it in the majority opinion.105 They point to the questions asked by the
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Justices during oral argument. For instance, Justice Scalia posed the following question about
viewpoint discrimination to the attorney for the school district:
The principal could not exclude an article that discussed teenage sexuality and
pregnancy of some of his students, and portrayed the whole thing in a favorable
light--in effect, sanctioning promiscuity by the students--but permit an article that
discussed the same topic, but seemed to frown upon that kind of activity. The
principal could not take a position on a subject like that. If he allows sexuality to
be talked about, he has to allow both the pros and the cons of adolescent sex to be
set forth. Is that right?106
Due to the Supreme Court’s evasiveness on the First Amendment content neutrality
principle’s application on the regulation of student speech, a circuit split emerged in the lower
courts. The Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits maintain that the content neutrality principle
still applies in the school context.107 On the other hand, both the First and Tenth Circuits permit
content-based regulations of student speech.108 In the later student speech case of Morse v.
Frederick, the Supreme Court again conveniently avoided directly addressing the content
discrimination issue present in the context of regulating student speech.
D. Morse v. Frederick
In Morse, a student was suspended from school for refusing to remove a banner that read
“BONG HiTS for JESUS” that he was displaying at a school-sponsored event across the street
from his high school. 109 The Ninth Circuit applied the substantial disruption analysis from
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Tinker and ruled that the school’s actions violated the student’s free speech rights.110 The
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, disagreed. Concluding that the poster was not schoolsponsored speech and that the reasonableness standard of Kulmeier did not apply, the Court
analyzed the issue under a different framework. Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion shaped
the issue as “whether a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student
speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug
use.”111 Essentially, the Court carved out an exception for drug-specific student speech.
The Court reasoned that the “‘special characteristics of the school environment’ and the
government interest in stopping student drug use . . . allow schools to restrict student expression
that . . . promot[ed] illegal drug use.”112 The majority’s analysis of the narrower issue placed
great emphasis on the harms of illegal drug abuse, stating, “[d]rug abuse by the Nation’s youth is
a serious problem. . . . Congress has declared that part of a school’s job is educating students
about the dangers of drug abuse . . . [] and many [] schools have adopted policies aimed at
implementing this message.”113 The Court indicated that the danger in this case – promoting
illegal drug use among students – was “far more serious and palpable” than a simple desire by
school officials to suppress an unpopular viewpoint.114 The majority pointed to Congress’s
pronouncement that schools must “educat[e] students about the dangers of illegal drug use.” 115
For these reasons, the government was reasonably restricting student speech to “protect those
entrusted to their care.”116
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The dissenting justices criticized the majority for permitting school officials to prohibit
certain viewpoints in the school context. Specifically, the dissent noted that the school punished
the unpopular viewpoint of promoting student drug use during the national war on drugs.117
Although content discrimination was in fact present, the majority and concurring justices
emphasized the fact that the speech at issue was not political discourse.118 The concurring
justices made clear that they would not have upheld the suspension if the school had targeted
speech with a political message. Specifically, Justice Alito wrote:
“I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (1) it goes no further
than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer
would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and (2) it provides no support for
any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any
political or social issue.”
The concurrence clarified that the punishment at issue was constitutional because illegal
drug use amongst students was a unique threat to students’ physical safety.119 In its briefs, the
school district argued that the First Amendment permitted it to “censor any student speech that
interferes with a school’s educational mission.”120 The concurring justices rejected this argument
for broad authority, warning that the “educational mission” argument would grant school boards
and officials the dangerous pass to curtail political speech on the basis of viewpoint
discrimination.121 Notably, the concurrence reiterated the majority’s reasoning when they warned
that any argument for limiting the free speech standards in public schools would have to be
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grounded in “some special characteristic of the school setting.”122 In Morse, the majority
perceived the unique threat to students’ physical safety to be the special characteristic present.123
E. Current Complexity of the Student Speech Standards and the Resulting Circuit Split124
In R.A.V., the Court explained that content discrimination is impermissible for any type
of speech restriction, including restrictions on unprotected speech.125 Nonetheless, the question
of whether the First Amendment principle of content neutrality applies to independent student
speech that is proscribable under Tinker’s substantial disruption standard remains unclear.
The Tinker decision and the Supreme Court cases on student speech that followed it
demonstrate that independent student speech in public schools is analyzed under Tinker and can
therefore only be regulated if it meets the substantial disruption test. However, this test does not
apply if the facts of the case fall within one of three categories.126 The Fraser decision carved out
the first exception to the Tinker standard by permitting schools to constitutionally restrict
students’ speech when the speech is “vulgar,” “lewd, indecent or offensive and would undermine
the school’s educational mission.127 Second, the Kuhlmeier decision allows schools to regulate
school-sponsored speech as long as the school’s actions meet a reasonableness test. Their actions
must be “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”128 Lastly, Tinker does not apply
to student speech that may “reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.”129
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Due to the Court’s lack of unambiguous analysis or pertinent discussion regarding
content discrimination or R.A.V. in the student speech cases that followed Tinker, a circuit split
occurred in the lower courts surrounding whether the principle of content neutrality applies in the
realm of regulating student speech.130 At least one commentator has suggested that the Supreme
Court’s decision to not discuss R.A.V. in Morse v. Frederick indicates “either the Court does not
deem R.A.V. applicable to the school setting or that R.A.V.'s precedential value is minimal in that
context.”131
PART III: CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE RELAXED IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE
CONTEXT OF ANTI-BULLYING STATUTES
Even if the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights and similar anti-bullying laws pose a
content discrimination issue under R.A.V., schools should be granted more leeway to regulate
bullying–a danger to students– when it substantially disrupts the educational environment.
Supreme Court precedent since its landmark student speech case in Tinker is contradictory and
unclear. Most importantly, the Court has narrowed its Tinker holding by carving out a number of
exceptions.132 Although the Court in R.A.V. seemed to require the application of strict scrutiny to
all content-based speech regulations, the unique conditions of the school setting and the state’s
role as educator both necessitate an alternate approach to restrictions on speech that constitutes
bullying. Supreme Court precedent indicates the Court has been reluctant to apply R.A.V. and
strict scrutiny to content-based regulations of student speech since Tinker.133 This indicates that
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the principle of content neutrality should not be applied with the same rigor to evaluate
regulations on student speech that involve bullying.
To comprehend the current status of First Amendment jurisprudence in public schools,
we must take into account two recurring premises in the Supreme Court’s decisions since Tinker.
The Supreme Court has continuously acknowledged the interests of the state, local government,
and school officials in carrying out the educational mission of their schools. The Court’s
opinions indicate that certain regulations on student speech in schools are permissible in order to
carry out this unique mission. In addition, the Court since Tinker has also stated that schools are
a forum for the marketplace of ideas, a rationale for content neutrality that many argue has less
force in the context of public schools.134 The Court has placed particular emphasis on political
speech within the marketplace
A. The Role of States and Local Governments as Educators
Repeatedly, the Supreme Court’s precedent has acknowledged the interests of the states
and local governments, including school officials, in carrying out their educational mission. As
one commentator explained, “education transmits more than information. . . . It is the indivisible
process of acquiring beliefs, premises, and dispositions that are our windows on the world, that
mediate and filter our experience of it, and that govern our evaluation and judgment of it.”135
Chief Justice Warren once wrote “[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
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education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship.”136
a. Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has recognized that public schools serve as “principal instrument[s]”
in introducing children to cultural values, in preparing them for their future professional careers,
and in assisting them to appropriately adjust to the environment beyond the schoolhouse gate.137
The Court has stressed the significance of public schools “in the preparation of individuals for
participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests.”138 The
Court has consistently acknowledged that our schools are places where we establish our
“fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system” and for
teaching the “shared values of a civilized social order.”139 The process of public education is a
process of citizenship, and the Court has indicated that it is not one “confined to books, the
curriculum, and the civics class.”140 More importantly, the civic education process encompasses
teaching by example. Therefore, schools are responsible for teaching the “shared values of a
civilized social order.”141
The case law demonstrates that the perception of the government’s unique role as
educator was continuously echoed in student speech cases following Tinker. The majority in
Tinker expressed the concern that permitting schools to silence student political expression that
was not disruptive could lead schools to become “enclaves of totalitarianism.”142 Justice Black’s
dissent rejected this concern, and stressed that the Constitution does not compel our “teachers,
136

Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
138
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 876 (1982) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
139
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
140
Id.
141
Id. at 683.
142
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
137

26

parents and elected school officials to surrender control of the American public school system to
public school students.”143
The Court in Fraser reiterated Justice Black’s concern for the execution of the state’s
educational mission. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, wrote that “the
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate
properly rests with the school board” rather than with judges. 144 The Court also acknowledged
that a student’s freedom to express an unpopular and controversial viewpoint in the context of a
school “must be balanced against [] society's countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.” More importantly, the Court wrote that a student’s
constitutional rights are “not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.”145
In Kuhlmeier, the Court again echoed these ideas. In quoting Fraser, the Court clarified
that a school does not have to accept student speech that is “inconsistent with its ‘basic
educational mission.’”146 Schools are permitted to regulate such speech despite the fact that the
government could not censor similar speech in a different context. The Court made clear that a
student’s First Amendment claims must be considered in this unique context. In Morse v.
Frederick, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Fraser’s declaration that “the constitutional rights of
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings” in light of the “special characteristics of the school environment.”147 Concurring in the
judgment, Justice Thomas acknowledged that the Court, “continue[s] to distance [itself] from
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Tinker, but [it] neither overrule[s] it nor offer[s] an explanation of when it operates and when it
does not.”148
The Supreme Court’s precedent at least indicates that the principle of content neutrality
does not apply with the same rigor in the realm of student speech when the speech at issue
collides with the school’s “educational mission.”149 As one commentator has suggested, the
Court has had numerous opportunities to finally clarify this exact issue yet it has chosen not to
do so.150 Accordingly, many lower courts have reinforced the “educational mission” rationale to
permit content discrimination in the regulation of student speech.
b. Lower Court Precedent
Subsequent cases in the lower courts have echoed the importance of the role of the state
as educator and the deference that should be granted to a government’s judgment in fulfilling
that role.151 The Third Circuit case of Sypniewski v. Warren Hills is arguably the most illustrative
example of a court granting the state the necessary flexibility for executing its educational
mission.
The Third Circuit dismissed a content discrimination challenge to an anti-harassment
policy in a public school on the basis of the school’s unique mission of educating the nation’s
youth.152 The plaintiffs challenged the policy as too narrow because it targeted only racially
provocative expression for punishment and thereby amounted to content discrimination. The
plaintiffs argued that although the school district was able to sanction speech that is disruptive
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under Tinker, R.A.V. did not allow the school to discriminate between disruptive speech that
embodies racially oriented themes and disruptive speech that does not.153
The Third Circuit acknowledged that the racial harassment policy was content-based and
would most likely be found unconstitutional under R.A.V. in a different context. However, due to
the uniqueness of the public school setting and the critical function of the state and local
governments as educators, the court reasoned it was the government’s responsibility to
“maintain[] an environment conducive to fulfilling [its] educational mission.”154 The court
deemed this responsibility, “perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.”155 The decision emphasized a court’s need to defer to the judgments of state and
local governments as they must be granted flexibility to carry out their educational mission.
In Sypniewski, the Third Circuit paid “due respect . . . to the needs of school authority,”
and permitted content discrimination in its racial harassment policy as a result. 156 The court
placed great emphasis on the fact that the school district had identified a certain class of speech –
racial speech – that was “subject to a well-founded fear of conflict” because of its content.157 The
school district’s well-founded fear of conflict due to racial harassment was grounded in the
history of disruption and interference with the legitimate rights of other students. To exercise its
educational mission and maintain order within the school, the district was permitted to enact
unambiguous rules of conduct that “narrowly target[ed] the identified problems.”158
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The court did not engage in R.A.V.’s content discrimination analysis, but it made clear
that it was “not entirely clear” how it was applied to analysis in this realm of free speech.159
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit held that “adopting a policy limited to racially provocative speech
was an acceptable non-discriminatory response by school authorities to the history of race
relations in Warren Hills schools.”160 In other words, the school district had a legitimate basis to
enact the formal policy. The court acknowledged that such content discrimination would be
found unconstitutionally content-based in a context outside of the school setting.161 The Third
Circuit also warned that when a school distinguishes between subclasses of proscribable
disruptive speech under Tinker on no legitimate basis, the R.A.V. content neutrality principle
might be implicated on grounds that the school is disfavoring certain view expressed by the
students.162
The same court later reinforced the substantial leeway granted to school administrators,
especially in the elementary school setting, when it stated that, “[W]here an elementary school's
purpose in restricting student speech within an organized and structured educational activity is
reasonably directed towards preserving its educational goals, we will ordinarily defer to the
school's judgment.”163
B. Preventing Bullying is a Reasonable Educational Goal
To fulfill their roles as educators and carry out their educational missions, states and local
governments must be granted sufficient leeway to prevent and halt bullying in our public
schools. As one court indicated, the issue of bullying in American public schools is “pervasive; it
is perceived by educators as serious, particularly in the middle school years . . . It is the most
159
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common type of violence in our schools.”164 More importantly, it is a problem that disturbs a
student’s “school performance, emotional well-being, mental health, and social development.”165
In Sypniewski, the Third Circuit stated that intimidating another student, including name-calling,
was exactly the type of conduct that “schools are expected to control or prevent.”166 In light of
this, the court quipped that, “[t]here is no constitutional right to be a bully.”167
At the 2010 Federal National Bullying Summit in Washington, D.C., Secretary of
Education Arne Duncan gave the following remarks: “A school where children don’t feel safe is
a school where children struggle to learn. It is a school where kids drop out, tune out, and get
depressed.” The Secretary advised that, “[b]ullying is definable” and [g]ood prevention programs
work to reduce bullying.”168
a. Empirical Research Findings: Bullying in Public Schools
The bullying issue made its entrance into the public limelight after the media publicized a
number of student suicides, including New Jersey’s very own Tyler Clementi.169 Since then, the
issue has been more elaborately studied, and research findings support what many courts and
legislatures now acknowledge: bullying is a dangerous impediment to the goals of public
education. As of this year, approximately forty-eight states have enacted legislation against
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school speech that constitutes bullying.170 In New Jersey, the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act
was enacted after a year of research on the harms and detrimental effects of bullying in the
school setting.171 Such research has aided states and local governments in drafting and
implementing their anti-bullying legislation. The findings confirm that bullying in the school
environment affects both the victims and the bullies’ ability to perform in the classroom, their
desire to learn, as well as their decisions to attend school on a day-to-day basis.
The research findings indicate that the bullying issue is pressing and ongoing. Eight
percent of students miss one day of class per month for fear of encountering a bully.172 Every
seven minutes, a student is bullied on their school’s playground, and 85% of the time, there is no
intervention by a peer or an adult.173 Various studies have found that missing school due to a fear
of victimization “not only impair[s] academic achievement, but also hinder[s] future financial
and educational opportunities.”174 Empirical data indicates that bullying is psychologically
detrimental to both bullies and victims.
The New Jersey Department of Education’s report on the implementation of the antibullying law explains that bullying generally starts in elementary school, and peaks in sixth
through eighth grade. It persists throughout high school but it decreases with age.175 The
statistics of the Commissioner’s Annual Report reveal that thirty percent of U.S. students in sixth
through tenth grade are “involved in moderate or frequent bullying either as bullies, as victims,
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or as both.”176 In addition, the detrimental effects of bullying on students include serious
psychological and behavioral effects that manifest themselves in low self-esteem, anxiety,
depression, suicide, violence and criminal behavior.177
The effects of bullying on academic performance are especially problematic as student
learning and development is advanced in a school setting where students feel safe. However,
studies show that a major consequence of bullying behavior is poor grades.178 In addition, the
relationship between students and adults suffers when students witness bullying at school and no
adult intervention takes place. Students begin to perceive the adults as lacking in control or as
apathetic to bullying.179 Ineffective regulation of bullying in the school environment sends the
wrong message to students
Both experience and research show that bullying disturbs the learning environment. As
Secretary Duncan made clear, “bullying is very much an education priority that goes to the heart
of school performance and school culture.”180 In accordance with its in loco parentis role as
educator, the government should be able to combat the bullying problem without grappling with
the complex issues of remaining content neutral.
B. Students in Public Schools are a “Captive Audience”
In addition to the considerations involved when the government acts as educator,
significant public policy concerns arise in the public school setting because it involves a captive
audience of students. The Supreme Court has held that since the public workplace environment
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involves a “captive” audience,181 the important public policies that govern such an environment
“may justify some limitations on the free speech rights of employers and employees.”182 In
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court stated, “[e]ven the most heated political
discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other
participants and audiences.”183 At least one commentator has concluded that Fraser’s holding
permitted schools to regulate a student’s mode of expression, and especially lewd and vulgar
speech that involved a captive audience.184 In Fraser, the state had a substantial interest of
protecting young students from inappropriate material in a setting where they are not voluntary
participants.
In Saxe v. State College Area School District and Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional
Board of Education, the Third Circuit addressed anti-harassment or anti-bullying policies in
public schools. In that case, a school district’s policy goal was to “provid[e][] all students with a
safe, secure, and nurturing school environment,” and defined harassment as, “verbal or physical
conduct based on one's actual or perceived race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has the purpose or effect of
substantially interfering with a student's educational performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile or offensive environment.”185 The policy also established procedures for the reporting and
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resolution of complaints. Its non-exhaustive list of punishments for harassment included
warning, suspension, expulsion, transfer, termination, training, education, or counseling.186 Two
students brought suit challenging the policy on First Amendment grounds and seeking the
remedy of an injunction. They labeled the policy a “hate speech code" and alleged it was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The students believed they were likely to be punished
under the policy for speaking out about their religious beliefs, engaging in symbolic activities
relaying those beliefs, and distributing religious literature.187
The Third Circuit acknowledged that First Amendment concerns are raised when laws or
policies against harassment regulate written or oral expression.188 Harassment statutes that
punish solely “verbal insults, pictorial or literary matter” impose content-based viewpoint
discriminatory restrictions on speech and must therefore be subject to strict scrutiny.189 The court
clarified that although a tension exists between anti-harassment laws and the First Amendment’s
content neutrality principle, the prevention of discrimination in the school setting was certainly a
compelling governmental interest that could possibly overcome a content discrimination
challenge.190 The court further suggested that speech may be more proscribable when the
audience is “captive” and cannot avoid the speech.191 The Third Circuit in Saxe acknowledged
the school setting as similar to the workplace setting, where the government’s public policy
interests may outweigh the students’ free speech rights. The Third Circuit did not strike the antiharassment policy down on these grounds however. It found it was overbroad because it

unsolicited derogatory remarks, jokes, demeaning comments or behaviors, slurs, mimicking, name calling, graffiti,
innuendo, gestures, physical contact, stalking, threatening, bullying, extorting or the display or circulation of written
material or pictures.” Id.
186
Id. at 203 (internal quotation marks omitted).
187
Id. at 203-04.
188
Id. at 206.
189
Id.
190
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 209.
191
Id. at 210 (citing Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 121, 158, 980 P.2d 846, 870 (1999)).

35

restricted “substantially more speech than could be prohibited under Tinker's substantial
disruption test.”192
As the Saxe opinion demonstrated, the traditional justifications for the principle of
content neutrality, including the marketplace of ideas theory, have less force in the public school
setting. Just as the workplace is not perceived as a forum for the testing of political and social
ideas, the public school classroom is not a public forum where “teachers, parents and elected
school officials [] [must] surrender control of the American public school system to public
school students.”193 Yet many have utilized the marketplace of ideas rationale to support a
steadfast prohibition on content discrimination. As many courts and commentators have
recognized, pupils in the secondary school context, unlike adults and students in universities,
make limited contributions to the marketplace of ideas.194 Content-based discrimination is
deemed problematic because it creates “the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to
advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas . . . or manipulate the
public debate through coercion rather than persuasion."195 In the context of bullying in public
schools, the regulation of such speech will most likely not curtail the expression of a political
viewpoint such as Tinker’s. For this reason, among others, there seems less of a concern that
regulating student speech on the basis of content could lead schools to become “enclaves of
totalitarianism.”196
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Our society’s commitment to freedom of speech must be balanced with the government’s
need to educate our students, who are a captive audience. Students’ free speech interests in the
context of bullying legislation must give way to other countervailing concerns, especially when
dealing with punishing student speech that constitutes bullying–a pervasive issue that frustrates
and impedes the execution of the government’s educational mission.
CONCLUSION
At the White House Conference on Bullying Prevention in March 2011, Secretary of
Education Duncan stated, “I am convinced that we are moving toward a day when students will
be safe from taunts, teasing, and physical violence in our schools. This work won't be easy. This
requires a fundamental cultural shift in our schools . . . Bullying is a moral and educational issue.
It goes to the heart of school performance and the ability of a student to learn.”197 Due to the
countervailing interest of effectively educating our youth in a safe and conducive environment,
the principle of content neutrality should not apply or should be relaxed in the context of
restricting student speech that constitutes bullying. Content discrimination should be permitted in
this realm of free speech regulation because bullying impedes the state’s ability to exercise its
role and duty as educator. Further, the school environment involves a “captive” audience similar
to that of the workplace setting, where the Supreme Court has held that the pressing public
policies that govern such an environment may justify some limitations on free speech that would
not be permissible in another context.
What a student can express through speech that constitutes bullying he or she can also
express without bullying. The disruptive nature of this type of speech, as well as the state’s
pressing interest in carrying out its educational mission, are both countervailing interests that
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should grant educators limited leeway to implement content-based restrictions in their regulation
of bullying in the public school setting. As one commentator has suggested, “What could be
more ‘substantially disruptive’ to the smooth functioning of an education institution than
students who are afraid to come to school or who are miserable once they arrive?”198
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